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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 15-2884 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RANDY BAADHIO, 
                  Appellant 
_____________ 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Crim. No. 13-cr-00004-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 6, 2016 
____________ 
 
Before: FISHER, RENDELL and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  April 25, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
 On July 30, 2015, Randy Baadhio pleaded guilty before District Judge Michael A. 
Shipp to a Grade C Supervised Release Violation for failure to comply with the condition 
                                              
*   This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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of supervised release that required him to make monthly restitution payments. Baadhio 
was sentenced to 60 days’ imprisonment, a one-year extension of supervised release, and 
two additional conditions of supervised release─ “treatment in a mental health program” 
and “computer monitoring”. He appealed, and argues to us that Judge Shipp erred by 
extending his term of supervised release and imposing the two special conditions. He 
does not appeal the 60 days of imprisonment. We will affirm.   
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Baadhio has a substantial criminal history, which includes convictions for the 
unlawful use of an access device and the fraudulent use of a credit card. In 2006, 
following a New Jersey conviction for theft of services, Baadhio escaped from a halfway 
house, and began using identities he obtained from the internet to apply for and receive 
credit cards in others’ names, ultimately building up $142,423.40 in unauthorized 
charges.  
On June 15, 2007, as a result of this activity, Baadhio was arrested, charged and 
eventually pleaded guilty in the District of Connecticut to one count of access device 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2). On May 29, 2009, he was sentenced to 57 
months’ incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and $200 per month in restitution. 
He appealed, an appeal the Second Circuit summarily rejected. See United States v. 
Baadhio, 439 F.App’x. 43 (2d Cir. 2011).  
Baadhio was released from federal prison on August 5, 2011 and his custody was 
turned over to the New Jersey Department of Corrections in connection with his escape 
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from the halfway house. The date on which his federal supervision commenced is unclear 
— one document lists July 26, 2012 as the start date, SA1, and others list August 5, 2011, 
JA10, 26. In any event, on January 2, 2013, jurisdiction over his supervised release was 
transferred from the District of Connecticut to the District of New Jersey. On February 
19, 2014, Judge Shipp granted a petition to modify the restitution condition of Baadhio’s 
supervised release, decreasing his monthly payment to $20.  
Between April 2014 and June 2015, Baadhio’s Probation Officer filed three 
petitions alleging numerous violations of his supervised release including, inter alia, 
allegations that he sent a threatening email to the Officer, failed to make his monthly 
restitution payments, opened a line of credit without permission, and committed 
aggravated assault by attacking a State parole officer.  Magistrate Judge Tonianne J. 
Bongiovanni twice released him on bail. She also required him to undergo mental health 
testing and warned him about the consequences of sending threatening e-mails to his 
Probation Officer. Finally, on June 24, 2015, after being arrested in connection with the 
Third Amended Petition, Judge Bongiovanni detained Baadhio pending his violation 
hearing.  
At the July 30, 2015 violation hearing before Judge Shipp, Baadhio pleaded guilty, 
admitting that he failed to pay his $20 monthly restitution. Despite him having a 
Guidelines range of 7 to 13 months, the Government argued for a sentence of two 
months’ imprisonment with no supervised release to follow. Not surprisingly, Baadhio’s 
counsel did not object. As noted above, however, Judge Shipp imposed a 60-day sentence 
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and a one-year term of supervised release because he was “not persuaded that this should 
be a case where there is no supervision,” JA4, 23-24, and imposed the two special 
conditions. Baadhio, again, did not object and told Judge Shipp that his Probation Officer 
“has done the very best for me,” and was treated him “fairly and humanly.” JA22-23. The 
remaining violations were dismissed.  
Baadhio now argues to us that Judge Shipp erred by (1) imposing a one year 
extension of supervised release contrary to the Government’s recommendation and likely 
not authorized by statute, and (2) by imposing special conditions that were not reasonably 
related to his violation for failing to make his monthly restitution payments. Meanwhile, 
Baadhio was sending letters to Judge Shipp, including a pro se request to suspend his 
supervised release and the special conditions pending appeal. In that request, Baadhio 
alleged misconduct both by his Probation Officer (despite his conflicting statements at his 
violation hearing) and by others, and claimed that he was not actually guilty of his failure 
to make restitution payments. Judge Shipp denied the request. This appeal followed.  
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(e). We have 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Baadhio did not object to 
the terms and conditions of supervised release imposed at his violation hearing. We thus 
review for plain error. United States v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72, 77, 82 (3d Cir. 2011).  
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Whether the District Judge plainly erred by imposing one year of supervised 
release.   
 
 When revoking supervised release and imposing a sentence of imprisonment, a 
court may also impose a supervised release “tail,” which is “the term of supervised 
release that may be imposed following a term of post-revocation imprisonment.” United 
States v. Williams, 675 F.3d 275, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2012). A supervised release “tail” “ 
‘shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that 
resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was 
imposed upon revocation of supervised release.’ ” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h)). 
 Baadhio argues that it was plain error for Judge Shipp to impose one year of 
supervised release in addition to the 60-day prison sentence because: (1) it “was contrary 
to the Government’s recommendation;” and (2) it “may exceed the maximum length of 
time that may be imposed under his conviction.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. As to the latter, he 
states that it is “unclear . . . whether this additional year after his imprisonment on a 
revocation exceeds the supervised release that was authorized under the original 
sentence[,]” due to the conflicting dates of his supervised release commencement, id. at 
11), and argues that because of his intervening incarcerations on both State and Federal 
charges, there is no clear calculation as to the actual time he has served on supervision.  
 First, Baadhio’s argument regarding Judge Shipp’s “failure” to adopt the 
Government’s sentencing recommendation is without merit as “a district court is in no 
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way bound by the parties’ sentencing recommendations.” United States v. Schweitzer, 
454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006). Moreover, the record is clear that Baadhio needed 
more supervision, as Judge Shipp quite properly found. Second, aside from the fact that it 
is not enough on plain error review to simply state that it is “unclear” whether the 
additional year of supervised release exceeds what was authorized by statute, Baadhio 
was convicted of one count of access device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2). 
That offense carried a maximum term of supervised release of thirty-six months. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2). As stated above, a supervised release “tail” “‘shall not exceed the 
term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the 
original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that had been imposed 
upon revocation of supervised release.’” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). Under 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(h), the maximum term of supervised release permitted was thirty-four months; the 
maximum of thirty-six months less the 60-days imprisonment imposed at Baadhio’s 
violation hearing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). Baadhio has simply failed to show plain error 
regarding the imposition of one year of supervised release.  
B. Whether it was plain error to impose two special conditions of supervised release.  
 The District Judge imposed two special conditions of supervised release: (1) 
“undergo treatment in a mental health program approved by the United States Probation 
Office until discharged by the Court;” and (2) “submit to an initial inspection by the U.S. 
Probation Office, and to any unannounced examinations during supervision, of your 
computer equipment” and “allow the installation on your computer of any hardware or 
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software systems which monitor computer use.” JA4. Courts may impose special 
conditions of supervised release where those conditions are “‘reasonably related to the 
factors set forth in [§ 3553(a)],’” and “‘involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is 
reasonably necessary’ to deter future crime, protect the public, and rehabilitate the 
defendant.” United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 272 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)-(2)); see also United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 
2005).  
 Baadhio argues that the imposition of “computer monitoring” and “mental health 
treatment are not reasonably related to the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) & (2), as the 
conditions impose a greater deprivation of liberty than “is reasonably necessary to 
achieve the § 3553(a)(2) purposes.” (Appellant’s Br. at 12) However, as he concedes in 
his brief (Id.), “[t]he § 3553(a) factors are fairly broad,” and “[c]ourts generally can[] 
impose…a condition [as long as there is] evidence that the condition imposed is 
“reasonably related” …to the crime or to something in the defendant's history.” Pruden, 
398 F.3d at 248-49. While “a district court should state on the record its reasons for 
imposing [a] condition,” Id. at 249, we nevertheless “may ... affirm [a special] condition 
if we can ascertain any viable basis for the ... restriction in the record before the District 
Court ... on our own.”  Heckman, 592 F.3d at 405. Judge Shipp did not make explicit 
findings to support the imposition of the two special conditions, but the record provides a 
substantial basis for their imposition.   
 As to the condition requiring mental health treatment, Baadhio’s Probation Officer 
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stated that his “behavior has become increasingly alarming,” and that he sent her a 
threatening email stating that “if you keep pushing…I will put you on the ground.” SA27.  
Id. Baadhio, of course, had praised his Probation Officer at his sentencing hearing, but 
then alleged misconduct by she and others in his pro se letter to Judge Shipp, and in the 
raft of bizarre allegations and civil actions that followed.  Magistrate Judge Bongiovanni, 
we note, had earlier seen the need for this special condition when she required that he 
undergo mental health testing and treatment. There is “ample support” in the record for 
the imposition of this special condition. See United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 409 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
 The record also well supports the imposition of the computer monitoring 
condition. At least one of Baadhio’s previous convictions involved the use of a computer 
in connection with fraudulently opening and using lines of credit, and he used the internet 
in connection with his Unlawful Use of an Access Device Conviction in the District of 
Northern California in 2001. (PSR ¶¶ 8-15, 32). Judge Bongiovanni warned Baadhio 
about his computer and internet use after he sent the threatening e-mail. And there is 
more, as detailed in the Government’s brief. 
 Despite Baadhio’s contention that monitoring of his computer vests his Probation 
Officer with unlimited authority to intrude on his fundamental rights, “probation officers 
must be allowed some discretion in dealing with their charges,” as “courts cannot be 
expected to map out every detail of a defendant's supervised release.” Heckman, 592 F.3d 
at 410. The computer monitoring restriction lasts just one year, is authorized by statute, 
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and is a practical way to protect the public from further crimes similar to those Baadhio 
has repeatedly committed.  Moreover, the Probation Officer will not have, as Baadhio 
asserts, “unfettered powers of interpretation,” as the terms of the supervised release state 
that “[a]ny dispute as to the applicability of this condition shall be decided by the Court.” 
A4.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.   
  
